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SUCCESSIONS
Katherine Shaw Spaht*

Illegitimates' Rights
Just as litigation and legislation concerning illegitimates' rights in
Louisiana has subsided and stabilized, the United States Supreme Court
rendered a decision on June 10, 1986, which will have impact on the
constitutional right of an illegitimate to inherit from a parent dying
before January 1, 1975. Any stability in successions law achieved by
Succession of Clivens' has been undermined by the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Reed v. Campbell.2
In Succession of Clivens, the Louisiana Supreme Court on original
hearing "held that Succession of Brown would be applied retroactively
as to co-heirs in intestate successions, and prospectively from the date
of its rendition, September 3, 1980, in testate successions and as to
third parties." 3 In Succession of Brown, 4 the Louisiana Supreme Court
had "held that La. C.C. art. 919 was unconstitutional in that it unreasonably discriminated against illegitimate children by denying them
the same inheritance rights in the successions of their fathers, under
any circumstances, as was enjoyed by their legitimate counterparts." 5
In declaring former article 919 unconstitutional in Brown, the court
relied upon "the United States Supreme Court case of Trimble v. Gordon
"
. . . and Article I, Section 3 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. 16
The question of whether Brown was to apply retroactively was raised
in Clivens in the context of the succession proceedings of the widow
of the deceased father of an acknowledged illegitimate child. The father
had died on September 24, 1971. The widow had been placed in pos-
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2.

426 So. 2d 585 (La. 1982)(on rehearing).
106 S. Ct. 2234 (1986).

3. 426 So. 2d at 593.
388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980).
5. Succession of Clivens, 426 So. 2d at 594.
6. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis by the court).
La. Const. art. I, § 3 (effective Jan. I, 1975): "No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously,
or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth ...."
4.
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session of his property after his death, 7 and subsequently died. The
illegitimate child intervened in the widow's succession proceedings. On
rehearing, the Louisiana Supreme Court concluded that "Succession of

Brown's declaration of unconstitutionality of La. C.C. art. 919 is retroactive to January 1, 1975, the effective date of the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution.''8

Although relying upon the Louisiana Constitution in fixing the date
of the applicability of Succession of Brown,9 the Louisiana Supreme
Court recognized that, "even were we not to find the date of the 1974

Louisiana Constitution controlling, a retroactive application of Brown
back to the date Trimble v. Gordon [April 26, 19771 was rendered,
would be necessary."' 0 The court apparently accepted the view that the
Trimble case need not be applied retroactively." Furthermore, the court

in its reasons for granting a rehearing mentioned the argument that
"unlimited retroactive application of Brown as against co-heirs in intestate successions would work a substantial injustice, especially in cases
from years past where the heir has either already disposed of his inheritance or relied on his ownership of the property to his detriment. ' "'2

7. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3062:
The judgment of possession rendered in a succession proceeding shall be prima
facie evidence of the relationship to the deceased of the parties recognized
therein, as heir, legatee, surviving spouse in community, or usufructuary, as the
case may be, and of their right to the possession of the estate of the deceased.
8. 426 So. 2d at 600.
9. 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980).
10. 426 So. 2d at 600.
il. Id.:
[N]o other state of which we are aware, has applied Trimble v. Gordon, in a
succession case, from a point later than Trimble's rendition date. Ford v. King,
268 Ark. 128, 594 S.W.2d 227 (1980); Stewart v. Smith, 269 Ark. 363, 601
S.W.2d 837 (1980); Frakes v. Hunt, 266 Ark. 171, 583 S.W.2d 497 (1979); In
re Rudder's Estate, 78 III. App. 3d 517, 34 III. Dec. 100, 397 N.E.2d 556
(1979); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 560 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1977); Murray v. Murray,
564 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1978); Matter of Sharp's Estate, 151 N.J.Super. 579, 377
A.2d 730 (1977); Allen v. Harvey, 568 S.W.2d 829 (Tenn. 1978); Winn v.
Lackey, 618 S.W.2d 910 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
See also Justice Dennis' discussion of the retroactivity of Trimble v. Gordon in his
dissenting opinion on original hearing in Clivens: "All other state supreme courts which
have considered the issue have applied Trimble prospectively, although some have given
it limited retroactivity to actions pending at the time the state case or Trimble was
decided." 426 So. 2d at 592.
12. 426 So. 2d at 593. See also the discussion in the majority opinion on original
hearing, which expressed different concerns from those of the opinion on rehearing:
Brown overruled a Civil Code article upon which individuals had relied for
generations. Legitimate children have been placed into possession of estates,
sold, mortgaged and, in some cases, dissipated them. Substantial uncertainty
and confusion would result if those who have relied to their detriment on prior
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Four years after the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Clivens,
the United States Supreme Court in Reed v. Campbell3 reversed and
remanded a decision of the Texas Court of Appeals which "held that
§42 of the Texas Probate Code nevertheless prevented appellant from
sharing in her father's estate because Trimble does not apply retroactively." 1 4 The appellant was the child of the decedent born subsequent
to an absolutely null marriage of the decedent and the appellant's
mother.' 5 Five legitimate children of the decedent had survived and
inherited his estate to the exclusion of the appellant. The decedent had
died four months before the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Trimble v. Gordon, 6 and one of his legitimate children had
been appointed administratrix of his estate. The succession was still open
in 1978 when the "appellant formally notified the administratrix and
the Probate Court of her claim to a one-sixth share of the estate."' 7
Rejecting the issue as one of retroactivity, the Court concluded "that
a State may not justify discriminatory treatment of illegitimates in order
to express its disapproval of their parents' misconduct."' 8 The Court
expressly recognized that a state may permissibly distinguish illegitimate
children from legitimate children if the legislative provisions substantially
relate to "the State's interest, in providing for the orderly and just
distribution of a decedent's property at death."' 9 For example, the Court

law became subject to the claims of illegitimate heirs. However, with intestate
successions, the element of detrimental reliance is generally present only as to
third parties. Brown mandates vast changes in estate and property ownership.
The importance of stability in land titles and the reliance on the former law
in property transactions favor prospective application.
Id. at 587.
13. 106 S. Ct. 2234 (1986).
14. 106 S. Ct. at 2236.
15. Id.:
In November 1957, Prince Ricker and appellant's mother participated in a
ceremonial marriage, but it was invalid because Ricker's divorce from his first
wife was not final. Appellant was born a year later....
[A] jury found that Ricker was her father but that he was never validly
I..
married to her mother; and the trial court denied her claim.
16. 430 U.S. 762, 97 S.Ct. 1459 (1977).
17. 106 S. Ct. at 2236.
18. 106 S. Ct. at 2237.
19. Id. The Court cites as authority its decision in Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 99
S. Ct. 518 (1978). See footnote 7 in Reed, 106 S. Ct. at 2237:
Although the dissenters did not believe the state interest was sufficient to support
the particular statute before the Court in that case, they agreed with the basic
proposition that this state interest may justify some differential treatment-'"New
York might require illegitimates to prove paternity by an elevated standard of
proof," id. at 279, 99 S. Ct., at 530 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).
See discussion concerning Louisiana's filiation statute in text accompanying infra notes
28-39.
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by citation and explicit language suggested that statutory provisions which
regulate proof of filiation" are permissible.2 The Court continued by
observing: "After an estate has been finally distributed, the interest in
finality may provide an additional, valid justification for barring the
belated assertion of claims, even though they may be meritorious and
even though mistakes of law or fact may have occurred during the
probate process."2' 2 Applying that conclusion about a state's interest in
legislation barring an illegitimate's claim, the court determined that,
"[iln this case, then, neither the date of his death [before April 26,
1977, date of Trimble v. Gordon] nor the date the claim was filed [after
April 26, 19771 had any impact on the relevant state interest in orderly
"...,23
administration .
The decision in Reed does affect the holding of the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Clivens. That the decedent's date of death was prior
to or after January 1, 1975, is no longer determinative of the issue of
the right of an illegitimate child to inherit from his parent. The significance of this observation and the impact of the Reed case on Louisiana law can only be assessed by a consideration of the following: the
application and the constitutionality of Louisiana's filiation statute; 24 the
identification of illegitimate children whose proof of filiation is not
governed by the filiation statute; the application of the liberative prescription statute where there is an onerous transfer to a third party;25
the application of the thirty-year prescriptive period to an acceptance
of the succession by the illegitimate child and his concomitant right to
recover from the other heirs;2 6 and the effect of a judgment of possession .2
Louisiana jurisprudence28 and other United States Supreme Court
decisions2 9 have rejected assertions that Louisiana's filiation statute or

20. See text accompanying infra notes 28-39.
21. 106 S. Ct. at 2237:
The state interest in the orderly disposition of decedents' estates may justify
the imposition of special requirements upon an illegitimate child who asserts a
right to inherit from her father, and, of course, it justifies the enforcement of
generally applicable limitations on the time and the manner in which claims
may be asserted.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id. The Court also concluded: "The state interest in the orderly administration
of Prince Ricker's estate would have been served equally well regardless of how the merits
of the claim were resolved." 106 S. Ct. at 2238.
24. La. Civ. Code art. 209.
25. La. R.S. 9:5630 (1983 & Supp. 1986).
26. La. Civ. Code arts. 1030, 1381.
27. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3062.
28. See, e.g., Succession of Grice, 462 So. 2d 131 (La. 1985).
29. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. I, 103 S. Ct. 2199 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456
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similar legislation of other states is unconstitutional. Furthermore, in

the Reed opinion, as already mentioned, 0 the Court recognized that it
has "upheld statutory provisions that have an evident and substantial
relation to the State's interest in providing for the orderly and just
distribution of a decedent's property at death."'" As authority for this
a statement, the Court cited Laili v. Lalli,32 which upheld New York's
proof of filiation statute because it was directly related to the identifiable
state interest in orderly devolution of property at death. If Louisiana's
filiation statute is constitutional, the peremption period," as well as the
expiration of the grace period within which to file suit afforded certain
illegitimate children34 may prevent serious disruption of successions where
the decedent died before January 1, 1975. Illegitimate children, excluded
by the peremptive statute or the expiration of the grace period, could
not establish their relationship to the decedent." Nevertheless, the filiation statute only applies to some illegitimate children; it does not apply
to illegitimate children who have been formally acknowledged3 6 or

U.S. 91, 102 S.Ct. 1549 (1982). See Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Persons,
41 La. L. Rev. 372, 382 (1981): "Yet, even in the United States Supreme Court decisions,
the interest the state has in the quality of proof necessary to establish filiation has been
recognized as important, particularly in view of the problems of stability of land titles
and stale or spurious claims." (footnote omitted). See also id. n.57, quoting from Trimble
v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 1465 (1977), and Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S.
259, 271, 99 S.Ct. 518, 526 (1978).
30. See text at supra notes 19-20.
31. 106 S.Ct. at 2237.
32. 439 U.S. 259, 99 S.Ct. 518 (1978).
33. La. Civ. Code art. 209 C:
The proceeding required by this article must be brought within one year of the
death of the alleged parent or within nineteen years of the child's birth, whichever
first occurs. This time limitation shall run against all persons, including minors
and interdicts. If the proceeding is not timely instituted, the child may not
thereafter establish his filiation, except for the sole purpose of establishing the
right to recover damages under Article 2315. A proceeding for that purpose
may be brought within one year of the death of the alleged parent and may
be cumulated with the action to recover damages.
34. 1980 La. Acts No. 549, § 4; 1981 La. Acts No. 720, § 2; both Acts are discussed
in Spaht, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982-Persons, 42 La. L. Rev. 403 (1982).
35. The assumption is that the decedent is the parent of the illegitimate child. If the
decedent is a relative other than the parent, the issue is whether the same proof of
filiation is required. If, for example, the decedent is a sibling, must the brother or sister
establish filiation to the common ancestor by some proof required to establish filiation
to the parent? To prove filiation between the common ancestor and the deceased sibling,
presumably the brother or sister could utilize La. Civ. Code art. 891, which defines a
parent as "one who is legitimately filiated to the deceased or who is filiated by legitimation
or by acknowledgement under Article 203 or by judgment under Article 209 or who has
openly and notoriously treated the child as his own and has not refused to support him."
(emphasis added).
36. La. Civ. Code art. 203.
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The impact of the Reed decision, therefore,

primarily concerns formally acknowledged children. Illegitimate children
who were legitimated by their parents had the same inheritance rights
as legitimate children even before January 1, 1975.1 9
If the illegitimate child can establish filiation by formal acknowledgement, he still must overcome other state statutory hurdles, just as

a legitimate child must, in order to claim an interest in the succession
of his parent who died before January 1, 1975. Under Civil Code article
1381, the heir "whose right was not known" may recover from the
other heirs his interest in "the property remaining in kind, and of the
value of whatever has been consumed or alienated.... -140 The heir
must, however, accept the succession within thirty years of the death
of the decedent, for "Itihe faculty of accepting . . . a succession becomes
barred by the lapse of time required for the longest prescription of the
rights to immovables. ' '4' The right of the illegitimate child to assert an
interest in immovable property of the deceased that has been alienated
by onerous title prescribes in two years from the finality of the judgment
of possession. 42 Interestingly enough, a sentence in Reed v. Campbell

37. La. Civ. Code arts. 198, 200.
38. La. Civ. Code art. 209 A:
A child not entitled to legitimate filiation nor filiated by the initiative of the
parent by legitimation or by acknowledgment under Article 203 must prove

filiation as to an alleged living parent by a preponderance of the evidence in
a civil proceeding instituted by the child or on his behalf within the time limit
provided in this Article.
(emphasis added). The article also does not apply to an illegitimate child who is presumed
to be the child of the husband of the mother under La. Civ. Code art. 184, if the child
seeks to establish -filiation to a father other than his mother's husband. See Griffin v.
Succession of Branch, 479 -So. 2d 324 (La. 1985).
39. La. Civ. Code art. 199. See also Davenport v. Davenport, 116 La. 1009, 41 So.
240 (1906), which reaches the same conclusion about children legitimated by authentic
act under La. Civ. Code art. 200.
40. La. Civ. Code art. 1381:
If, after the partition an heir appears, whose death has been presumed on
account of his long absence, or whose right was not known, as if a second
testament unknown, until then, should entitle him to inherit with the others,
the first partition must be annulled, and another must be made of all the
property remaining in kind, and of the value of whatever has been consumed
or alienated, in order that he may have the share of the whole to which he is
entitled.
41. La. Civ. Code art. 1030. See also Kinney v. Waddell, 171 So. 2d 782 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1965); Lee v. Jones, 224 La. 231, 69 So. 2d 26 (1953); Sun Oil Co. v. Tarver,
219 La. 103, 52 So. 2d 437 (1951).
42. La. R.S. 9:5630 A (1983 & Supp. 1986):
An action by a person who is a successor of a deceased person, and who has
not been recognized as such in the judgment of possession rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction, to assert an interest in an immovable formerly owned
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suggests that the judgment of possession, if it is a final distribution of
property, may justify denying the acknowledged illegitimate the right to
inherit. If the judgment of possession justifies denying the acknowledged
child a right to inherit, the period of liberative prescription designed to
protect third party transferees need not be invoked. The prescriptive

period only applies if there is a judgment of possession.
The following language in the Reed decision suggests that the rendition of the judgment of possession may justify denying an acknowledged child the right to inherit from a parent dying before January 1,
1975: "After an estate has been finally distributed, the interest in finality
may provide an additional, valid justification for barring the belated
assertion of claims, even though they may be meritorious and even
though mistakes or law or fact may have occurred during the probate
process."" 3 Nevertheless, the judgment of possession is only "prima facie
evidence" of the relationship of the deceased to the parties recognized
as heirs and legatees "and of their right to the possession of the estate
of the deceased." 44 The jurisprudence' and the legislation 46 recognize
that the judgment of possession is not conclusive. Under Code of Civil

by the deceased, against a third person who has acquired an interest in the
immovable by onerous title from a person recognized as an heir or legatee of
the deceased in the judgment of possession, or his successors, is prescribed in
two years from the date of the finality of the judgment of possession.
43. 106 S. Ct. at 2237 (emphasis added).
44. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3062.
45. In Quiett v. Estate of Moore, 378 So. 2d 362, 367 (La. 1979), on rehearing, the
court explained:
A judgment of possession is prima facie evidence of the right of the heirs in
whose favor it was rendered to take possession of decedent's estate; however,
it is not a basis for a plea of res judicata or conclusive evidence against persons
having an adverse interest in or claim against the estate, such as heirs or creditors
of the estate. Taylor v. Williams, 162 La. 92, 110 So. 100 (1926).
(emphasis added).
See also Jackson v. D'Aubin, 338 So. 2d 575 (La. 1976) (on rehearing); Succession of
Feist, 274 So. 2d 806 (La. App. 4th Cir.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 287 So. 2d 514
(La. 1973).
46. La. Civ. Code art. 1381; La. R.S. 9:5630 (1983 & Supp. 1986). In discussing
the reasons for the predecessor to La. R.S. 9:5630, which was La. R.S. 9:5682, enacted
in 1962, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Jackson v. D'Aubin, 338 So. 2d 575, 581 (La.
1976), explained:
While, as we stated previously, a judgment of possession is only prima facie
evidence of the relationship of the deceased to the recognized heirs or legatees,
the legislature has endeavored to give a measure of protection to third persons
who acquire property from or through a recognized . . . heir or legatee. . ..
[Tihe legislature, in enacting this statute, was attempting to balance the opposing
interests involved: protection of inheritance rights, especially against possible
fraud or abuse of succession procedure; and stabilization of titles, through
affording greater prescriptive benefits where third persons rely upon succession
judgments.
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Procedure article 3393, a succession may be reopened "if other property
47
of the succession is discovered or for any other proper cause ....
Yet, in recent years the legislature has attempted to protect third parties
who have relied upon the judgment of possession. 48 Because it is a
judicial event recognizing what has occurred by operation of law, 49 and
because it was a probate proceeding in which the illegitimate daughter
in Reed filed her claim,50 it is reasonable to argue that the judgment
of possession in Louisiana is the nearest equivalent to a "final adjudication" of succession property mentioned by the Court in Reed. It
will be difficult, however, to argue the strength of Louisiana's interest
in the final adjudication of property in a succession if legitimate children
are not precluded from reopening the succession of a long-dead parent.
Prophetically, Judge Redmann of the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeal, in a dissenting opinion in 1983, expressed the view that the
decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Succession of Clivens5' could
not be reconciled with Trimble v. Gordon. 2 Arguing that the date of
death of the decedent should not determine inheritance rights, Judge
Redmann observed:

47. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3393 A. According to the jurisprudence, the purpose of
this article was primarily to deal with overlooked succession property. Molero v. Boss,
190 So. 2d 141 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 2, 193 So. 2d 523 (1967).
Reopening the succession is discretionary, not mandatory, under the language of the code
article. Succession of Mohana, 351 So. 2d 1287 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
354 So. 2d 200 (La. 1978); Succession of Yancovich, 289 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974); Danos v. Waterford Oil Co., 225 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied,
254 La. 856, 227 So. 2d 595 (1969). For examples of what is or is not "proper cause"
for reopening the succession, see Succession of Lasseigne, 488 So. 2d 1303 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1986); Succession of Riggio, 395 So. 2d 361 (La. App. 1st Cir.), vacated on other
grounds and remanded, 405 So. 2d 513 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 472 So. 2d 33 (La.
1985); Succession of McLendon, 383 So. 2d 55 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980); Flanner v.
Succession of Flanner, 338 So. 2d 355 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 340 So.
2d 999 (La. 1977); Succession of Yancovich, 289 So. 2d 855 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974);
Succession of Trouard, 281 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
48. See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:5630 (1983 & Supp. 1986), supra note 42; and La. Code
Civ. P. art. 3393 C:
The reopening of a succession shall in no way adversely affect or cause loss
to any bank, savings and loan association or other person, firm or corporation,
who has in good faith acted in accordance with any order or judgment of a
court of competent jurisdiction in any previous succession proceedings.
49. La. Civ. Code arts. 934, 940.
50. 106 S. Ct. at 2236:
The estate was still open in February 1978, when appellant formally notified
the administratrix and the Probate Court of her claim to a one-sixth share of
the estate. In due course, she filed a formal complaint; a jury found that Ricker
was her father but that he was never validly married to her mother; and the
trial court denied her claim.
51. 426 So. 2d 585 (La. 1983).
52. 430 U.S. 762, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977).
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The correct conclusion is that the right of an illegitimate to
inherit does not derive from the Louisiana supreme court's opinion in Succession of Brown but from the Equal Protection
Clause, U.S. Const. Amend. 14. La.C.C. 919 violated that Clause
in 1974 as much as did the Illinois act that Trimble invalidated.
La. C.C. 919 also violated the Equal Protection Clause on
December 31, 1973, when Albert Toca, Jr. died."
He was right.
Acceptance with Benefit of Inventory
The title of Act 602 of 1986 describes it as "relative to the admin-

istration of successions; to provide that a successor accepts a succession
under benefit of inventory. 5' 4 In fact, nothing in Act 602 explicitly
concerns the administration of successions," and the Act did not amend
the relevant Code of Civil Procedure articles. 5 6 The title, however, does
suggest that the author of the legislation understood that the substance

of the Act would affect the administration of successions. To what
extent the acceptance under Act 602 affects the administration of succes-

sions is uncertain. It may be that all successions must now be admin-

53. Succession of Toca, 433 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983)(Redmann,
C.J., dissenting).
54. "To enact R.S. 9:1421, relative to the administration of successions; to provide
that a successor accepts a succession under benefit of inventory; to provide for the liability
of the successor in such case; and to provide for related matters." 1986 La. Acts No.
602.
55. La. R.S. 9:1421 (as added by 1986 La. Acts No. 602, § 1):
Notwithstanding any provision in the law to the contrary, including but not
limited to Civil Code Articles 976 through 1013 and Civil Code Articles 1415
through 1466, every successor is presumed and is deemed to have accepted a
succession under benefit of inventory even though the acceptance is unconditional, and where an inventory or descriptive list has been executed. In such
case, every heir or legatee, whether particular or under universal title, shall not
in any manner become personally liable for any debt or obligation of the decedent
or his estate, except to the extent and value or amount of his inheritance;
however, any such heir or legatee may, in the petition for possession or by a
separate instrument in writing, personally obligate himself for any or all such
debts or obligations.
La. Const. art. 3, § 15, which requires that "[e]very bill ... contain a brief title
indicative of its object," assures notice of the scope of the proposed legislation but does
not require complete accuracy in description. See, e.g., Lafayette Parish School Bd. v.
Market Leasing Co., 440 So. 2d 81 (La. 1983); Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475 (La.
1981); Anzelmo v. Louisiana Comm'n on Ethics for Public Employees, 435 So. 2d 1082
(La. App. Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 441 So. 2d 1220 (La. 1983); Wiley v. Missouri Pacific
R.R. Co., 430 So. 2d 1016 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 431 So. 2d 1055 (La.
1983).
56. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3081-3395.
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istered, or it may be that the "private" administration of successions
is authorized. What is less ambiguous is that an unconditional acceptance,
which imposes personal liability upon the heir, 7 no longer exists if an
inventory or descriptive list is made.
Unfortunately, the legislation, which may radically affect the law
of successions, does not appear in the Civil Code. Act 602 adds a section
to the Revised Statutes, but begins by providing: "Notwithstanding any
provision in the law to the contrary, including but not limited to Civil
Code Articles 976 through 1013 [acceptance of successions) and Civil
Code Articles 1415 through 1466 [payment of the debts of a succession]
....''
The introductory clause of Louisiana Revised Statutes (La.
R.S.) 9:1421 would affect the Code of Civil Procedure, too, even though
it is not expressly mentioned. Thus, the provisions of the Civil Code
and the Code of Civil Procedure, in relative harmony on the effects of
an unconditional acceptance and acceptance with benefit of inventory
requiring an administration, have been amended by a provision of the
Civil Code Ancillaries.
. A more fundamental change accomplished by Act 602 is the modification of the legal philosophy represented historically by the French
phrase "le mort saisit le vif." Simplistically, this French legal principle
substitutes the heir for the deceased; 9 therefore, an unconditional or
simple acceptance is logically consistent. As a result of the adoption of
the legal principle of "le mort saisit le vif," the statutory scheme rejects
the principle that a succession is a legal entity with its own patrimony
which ceases to exist upon a judgment of possession. The most recent
rejection of the succession as a legal entity came with the revision of
the law of intestate succession in 1981. 60 By practically eliminating the
unconditional acceptance, Act 602 has done some damage to the consistency of a legal principle underlying the law of successions.
An examination of the legislation reveals internal inconsistencies.
For example, after the introductory phrase, the section added by Act
602 provides that "every successor is presumed and is deemed ....
"Is deemed" is a matter of law, thus conclusive; whereas, "is presumed"

57.

La. Civ. Code arts. 1013, 1420, 1423, 1426-1428.

58. La. R.S. 9:1421 (as added by 1986 La. Acts No. 602, § 1).
59. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 940-946, 1608-1610; La. Code Civ. P. arts. 426,
428.
60. La. Civ. Code art. 872 (as amended by 1981 La. Acts No. 919, § I), comment:
"It permits reference to the 'estate' of the deceased as defined, but grants no separate
legal existence to such an entity."
See also Lazarus, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1971-1972
Term-Successions and Donations, 33 La. L. Rev. 199 (1973); 3 Marcade, Explication
du Code Civil No. 47 at 33 (7th ed. 1873); 9 Aubry et Rau, Droit Civil Francais § 609
at 466 (1953).
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ordinarily means a simple presumption capable of being rebutted. As
the greater includes the lesser, the section provides that as a matter of
law every successor 6' accepts a succession under benefit of inventory
"even though the acceptance is unconditional. ' 62 The conversion of an
unconditional acceptance into an acceptance with benefit of inventory
is radical. The section continues, however, by modifying the legal conclusion: "and where an inventory or descriptive list has been executed."
The conversion achieved by the new section is thus dependent upon the
execution of an inventory or descriptive list; but there is no requirement
that the execution occur before the unconditional acceptance or that the
execution be by the heir who has unconditionally accepted. If "and
where" means "if," the stronger argument is that the inventory or
descriptive list must be executed before the unconditional acceptance for
the heir to enjoy the benefits of limited liability.63 Because an inventory
or descriptive list must be executed before the unconditional acceptance
of the heir, the impact of the new section will ordinarily be confined
65
to express acceptances, 64 as distinguished from tacit acceptances. No
61. La. Civ. Code art. 876: "There are two kinds of successors ...: Testate successors, also called legatees. Intestate successors, also called heirs."
La. R.S. 9:1421 (as added by 1986 La. Acts No. 602, § 1) adds confusion by the
following sentence: "In such case, every heir or legatee, whether particular or under
universal title ...." The legatee conspicuously absent from what should be interpreted
as a merely illustrative reference, is the universal legatee. "A universal legacy is a testamentary disposition, by which the testator gives to one or several persons the whole of
the property which he leaves at his decease." La. Civ. Code art. 1606.
62. See text of La. R.S. 9:1421 at supra note 55.
63. La. Civ. Code art. 1032:
The benefit of inventory is the privilege, which the heir obtains, of being liable
for the charges and debts of the succession only to the value of the effects of
the succession, by causing an inventory of these effects to be made within the
time and in the manner hereinafter prescribed.
See also La. Civ. Code art. 1054.
64. La. Civ. Code art. 988: "The simple acceptance may be either express or tacit.
It is express, when the heir assumes the quality of heir in an unqualified manner, in
some authentic or private instrument, or in some judicial proceeding."
La. Civ. Code art. 989:
By the word instrument used in the preceding article, is understood any writing
made with the intention of obliging himself or contracting as heir, and not a
simple letter or note in which the person who is called to the succession may
have styled himself the heir. Still less is a verbal declaration binding on him.
65. La. Civ. Code art. 988: "It is tacit, when some act is done by the heir, which
necessarily supposes his intention to accept, and which he would have no right to do but'
in his quality of heir."
La. Civ. Code art. 990: "It is necessary that the intention should be united to the
fact, or rather manifested by the fact, in order that the acceptance be inferred."See also La. Civ. Code arts. 993-1003. Because any heir may execute the inventory or
descriptive list which is a prerequisite to the application of La. R.S. 9:1421 (as added
by 1986 La. Acts No. 604, § I), there may be instances where the tacit acceptance of
one heir follows the execution of the inventory or list by another heir.
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language in the provision requires that the inventory or descriptive list
be executed by the heir who unconditionally accepts. Any heir, therefore,
who executes an inventory or descriptive list, affords his coheirs with
the benefit of limited liability, if the coheirs thereafter accept unconditionally. It must be remembered that nothing in Act 602 prohibits an
heir from accepting with benefit of inventory, to the extent that the
result is different from that which occurs under the new legislation when
an inventory or descriptive list has been executed. 66
Despite the legal conclusion afforded by the new legislation, it does
provide that "any such heir or legatee may, in the petition for possession
or by a separate instrument in writing, personally obligate himself for
any or all of such debts or obligations. ' 67 This clause recognizes that
the legal effect of an unconditional acceptance has been reversed, but
that the heir has the option to assume personal responsibility expressly
for the debts of the deceased. The clause introduces the novel idea that
the heir may be selective in assuming personal liability for the deceased's
debts by virtue of the language "any or all of such debts." The assumption by the heir may be by "separate instrument in writing," which
is roughly the equivalent of an express acceptance, 68 or "in the petition
for possession." It is the reference to the latter as a method for assuming
personal liability, combined with the reference in the title to administration of successions, that creates confusion.
An acceptance with benefit of inventory meant not only limited
liability under the Civil Code, 69 but also the administration of the
succession under the Code of Civil Procedure." Because the new section
changes the effect of unconditional acceptances with specific reference
to the Civil Code, it can be argued persuasively that the authors of the
legislation intended it to complement the present procedural scheme.
The reference to unconditional acceptances appears in the Code of Civil
Procedure articles which permit the rendition of a judgment of possession

66. An ordinary acceptance with benefit of inventory should result in an administration
of the succession, see generally La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3081-3395, while an unconditional
acceptance under La. R.S. 9:1421 (as added by 1986 La. Acts No. 602, § 1) should not.
See text at infra note 69.
67. La. R.S. 9:1421 (as added by 1986 La. Acts No. 602, § I). See text of La. R.S.
9:1421 at supra note 55.
68. La. Civ. Code art. 989. See supra note 64.
69. See supra note 63.
70. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 3131-37.
Even though there must be a descriptive list filed in every succession proceeding (La.
Code Civ. P. art. 2952, comment (b)), there must be an administration of the succession
without proof that the heirs are entitled to simple possession of an estate under La. Code
Civ. P. arts. 3001 (see infra note 71), 3004, or 3031.
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without an administration of the succession. 7' For example, under article
3001, the heirs of an intestate shall be sent into possession of the
deceased's property "without an administration of the succession, on
their ex parte petition, when all of their heirs are competent and accept
the succession unconditionally, and the succession is relatively free of
debt."7 2 As long as an heir has executed an inventory or descriptive
list, the unconditional acceptance in the petition for possession has the
7
effect of limiting an heir's liability to his interest in succession property. 1
Thus, one may conclude that the legislature, by use of the term "acceptance with benefit of inventory" meant only limited liability, not a
necessary administration of the succession. The petition for possession
may contain, however, the personal assumption of liability; therefore,
prudence may dictate adding the following language in the petition:
"unconditionally accepts, in accordance with La. R.S. 9:1421, without
assuming personal liability for any debts or obligations of the deceased."
Such language eliminates any possibility that the unconditional acceptance
in the petition constitutes an assumption of personal liability.
The 1986 legislation significantly increases the instances in which the
heir assumes only limited liability and permits, for the first time, limited
liability under the "possession without administration" procedure envisioned by Code of Civil Procedure article 3001. After the judgment
of possession, since neither the inventory74 nor the descriptive list75
necessarily contains an enumeration of the debts of the deceased, the
heir must retain evidence of his payment of the deceased's debts. If a
creditor of the deceased sues the heir, either the creditor must prove
that the heir has received value in excess of the decedent's obligations
and to that extent is obligated to him, or the heir must produce evidence

71.

La. Code Civ. P. art. 3001:

The heirs of an intestate shall be recognized by the court, and sent into possession
of his property without an administration of the succession, on their ex parte

petition, when all of the heirs are competent and accept the succession unconditionally, and the succession is relatively free of debt. A succession shall be
deemed relatively free of debt when its only debts are succession charges,
mortgages not in arrears, and debts which are small in comparison with the
assets of the succession.
The surviving spouse in community of an intestate shall be recognized by the
court on ex parte petition as entitled to the possession of an undivided half of

the community, and of the other undivided half to the extent that he has the
usufruct thereof, without an administration of the succession, when the succession
is relatively free of debt, as provided above.
See also La. Code Civ. P. arts.
* 3031-35 (testate succession without administration).
72. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3001.
73. La. Civ. Code arts. 1032, 1054.
74. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3133.
75. La. Code Civ. P. art. 3136.
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that the obligations of the deceased satisfied by him are equal to or
exceed the value of the assets received by him. The burden of proving
the elements of the heir's limited liability and the quality of that proof
are only some of the problems presented when the orderly liquidation
of the decedent's estate afforded by an administration is not used.
Act 602, which adds a new section to the Revised Statutes, demonstrates the difficulty of altering a delicately balanced statutory scheme
without sufficient deliberation. Even if the results are desirable, a significant modification of a legislative scheme requires consideration of
the impact of the change on all related provisions and the conceptual
bases underlying the scheme. Otherwise, disorganization and confusion
result, instead of the order and logic which our legislation should provide.

